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SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
delay and will overburden the courts.i5 But it is
doubtful that any solution would be more burden-
some than the present confusion, especially since
the practical effect on the courts of requiring some
further procedural rights as a matter of due process
would probably not be great. In light of the fact
that a majority of the states already recognize
probationer's right to a hearing, notice of the
charges against him, counsel, the presentation of
evidence and witnesses, cross-examination of those
witnesses testifying against him, and appeal,"' it
would not appear that a constitutional recognition
of these rights would cause substantial turmoil.
Nor would it seem that an extension of similar
rights to those who have no knowledge of them5 3
or to those who have no means of obtaining them'1
would significantly overburden the probation
system. The benefits, on the other hand, would be
161 Cf. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964).
'
53 Notes 75-80, supra.
153 E.g., abolishment of the waiver rule in regard to
procedural irregularities at revocation, warnings con-
ceming constitutional or statutory rights, etc.
154 E.g., the appointment of counsel to indigents, the
right to subpoena witnesses, etc. The equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is particularly
significant in gaining these rights. See Hoffman v.
State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1965); Perry v. Williard,
427 P.2d 1020 (Ore. 1967).
to make the realities of probation more consistent
with its goals and to eliminate much of the error,
uncertainty, confusion, and geographic inequity
which presently prevails.
CONCLUSION
Discretionary power performs a necessary func-
tion in the implementation of probation. The im-
position of individualized conditions is probation's
peculiar strength. At present, it is largely the ex-
perience of the personnel, rather than the frame-
work of the system, that makes probation work.
Hopefully the gathering of research and statistical
data will enable probation to become a behavioral
science, with improved techniques and guidelines
for supervision. But at least for now the states and
federal government should take a step in this
direction by placing and enforcing limitations on
the conditions that can be imposed on probationers.
In this way some of the abuses and errors of the
system can be eliminated.
No mere limitations, however, will justify the
place of discretionary power in the factual deter-
minations of a probation revocation proceeding. A
fair and just disposition of individuals can only be
achieved by eliminating discretionary power and
affording appropriate procedural protections to
probationers.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
OCTOBER, 1968, TERM
(Notes prepared by Leonard Singer, assisted by Robert A. Filpi and Bradford J. Race. The opinions
expressed therein are not necessarily those of the Journal's Editors.)
"[W]e must consider the two objects of desire,
both of which we cannot have, and make up
our minds which to choose. It is desirable that
criminals should be detected and to that- end
that all available evidence should be used. It
also is desirable that the Government should
not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when
they are the means by which the evidence is to
be obtained.... We have to choose .... 1
Alderman v. United States: Standing
and Disclosure
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Alderman v. United States2 dealt with electronic
surveillance which is subject to the dictates of
this Amendment whether or not there is an act-
ual physical intrusion of the premises for the
"Constitution protects people-and not simply
'areas' ". This provision is a bar to the "uninvited
ear" and allows persons to assume that the words
they speak in confidence "will not be broadcast to
2394 U.S. 165 (1969).
3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967).
1969]
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the whole world". 4 The main thrust of the Amend-
ment is to prevent official overreaching and abuse
in investigative activity.' The Amendment pre-
serves one's right to privacy by dictating that
officials may only act against an individual or his
possessions at certain times and after certain
procedures. There is no exception even for the most
sophisticated and unobtrusive electronic devices.
The problem frequently posed at the trial level is
whether any evidence was obtained or derived
from the use of overheard conversations that
violated the defendant's Constitutionally protected
rights. In Alderman v. United States,6 the Court
dealt with the procedure to be followed by the
District Courts in confronting that issue. The
Court, however, first delineated who would be
entitled to object to an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court,
held that if the "United States overheard conver-
sations of petitioner himself or conversations
occurring on his premises, whether or not he was
present or participated in those conversations" the
petitioner would be entitled to object Since the
occupant's privacy would be violated by the
surveillance, it makes no difference for the purposes
of standing that he was not a participant in the
illegally overheard conversation. Thus,
for purposes of a hearing to determine whether
the Government's evidence is tainted by illegal
surveillance, the transcripts or recordings of
the overheard conversations of any petitioner
or of third persons on his premises must be
duly and properly examined in the District
Court.8
Alderman reaffirms the rule that co-conspirators
or co-defendants do not have standing to object to
a violation of the Fourth Amendment unless that
violation was of their own rights. There is no need
to provide for the vicarious assertion of these
rights because the victim can and will object if
and when it becomes crucial for him to do so.9 The
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to effectively
deter illegal police action,10 and that purpose will
in no way be promoted by the allowance of the
non-offended to raise objections to searches and
4 Id. at 352.
1 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
0 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
7Id. at 176.
8Id..
9 Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
"0 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-7 (1965).
seizures of co-defendants. The Court suggested
that the proper legislative bodies could extend the
exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained by
an invasion of the privacy of others besides the
defendant.
The existing rule that
. unlawful wiretapping or eavesdropping,
whether deliberate or negligent, can produce
nothing usable against the person aggrieved by
the invasion"
does not extend only to those with a possessory
interest in the premises; anyone legitimately on the
premises has standing.1 The determinative inquiry
is whether the objector had a reasonable expecta-
tion of being free from any interference of his
privacy and confidence by official agencies, In
Jones v. United States 4 the defendant had a key to
and was frequenting, but rarely staying for long
periods of time, at a friend's apartment. He had
slept there oncei and he had some clothes there;
but, he paid no rent. In a ruling basedon Rule 41 (e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure this
relation to the property was found to be sufficient
to establish standing to object to an illegal search.
The Jones Court found that
[n]o just interest of the Government in the
effective and rigorou5 enforcement of the crim-
inal law will be hampered by recognizing that
anyone legitimately on premises where a
search occurs may challenge its legality by way
of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are
proposed to be used against him. This would of
course not avail those who; by virtue of their
wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy
of the premises searched. As petitioner's testi-
mony established Evans' consent to his pres-
ence in the apartment, he was entitled to have
the merits of his motion to suppress adjudi-
cated. 5
Similarly in United States v. Jeffers,1" the defend-
ant had a key to a hotel room which he used from
time to time. The occupants had never authorized
him to store narcotics there, and he had never
contributed to the expense of maintaining the
room. The Court held that even if the property
"Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176
(1969).
1 Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'4362 U.S. 257 (1960).
15 Id. at 267. See, Parker v. United States, 407 F.2d
540, 542 (9th Cir. 1969).
16 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
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was contraband subject to seizure and forfeiture,
the defendant still had standing to object to the
search. The Court refused to engage in any quib-
bling disputes over the extent of the proprietary
interest that one must claim in order to invoke the
benefits of the exclusionary rule. If a party has such
a relation to certain property that he can expect
his conversation and activity there to be in confi-
dence, he has the property interest necessary to
raise any violation of the exclusionary rule that
may occur thereon.
Mr. Justice Fortas dissenting in Alderman could
not tolerate illegal government activity being, in
effect, authorized under the "legalism" of stand-
ing.17 He found that electronic surveillance "pursu-
ant to a calculated institutional policy and direc-
tive" would be "more offensive to a free society
than the unlawful search and seizure of tangible
material"1 8 He would grant standing to object
under the Fourth Amendment to "one against
whom the search was directed".'Y 9 His argument
stresses the role that the exclusionary rule plays in
restraining government action. He is impressed
with the inequalityof the forces which are antago-
nists in the search and seizure context. Certainly,
he concludes, the Government should-not be able
to deprive a man of his liberty by the use of
evidence obtained unlawfully regardless of whose
privacy was actually invaded.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented because the
majority's position "permits property owners to
assert vicariously the personal rights of others".20
Only those whose conversations have actually been
intercepted have grounds to object to the unrea-
sonable search, he argues. He questioned whether
there would be differences drawn between invitees
or employees, or between business and personal
premises. It seems clear, however, from the Court's
use of the Mancusi-Jones authorities, that the
requisite proprietary interest will be found through
an inquiry dealing with foreseeability of electronic
surveillance and not with title concepts. Contrary
to Mr. Justice Harlan's doubts, those cases also
indicate that the necessary interest will not be of a
very great degree. "Inherent Fourth Amendment
rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of
ancient niceties of tort or real property law".n If
17 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 201
(1969).
18 Id. at 203.
1 Id. at 208.
21 Id. at 194.
2 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961).
the man is legitimately on the premises when the
objectionable search or seizure takes place, then he
has standing."
Alderman next outlines the proper procedure in
the District Court for deciding whether the evi-
dence against a defendant was tainted by illegally
overheard conversations. The Government must
disclose to the defendant any relevant records. The
Government is put at its peril either 1) to endanger
a life or the national security by disclosing these
files, or 2) to not turn over the fies and dismiss the
prosecution. The Court, in the face of the Govern.
ment's suggestion that the logs should be first
given to the judge for in camera inspection to
determine if any were arguably relevant, held that
"surveillance records as to which any petitioner
has standing to object should be turned over to
[the defendant] without being screened in camera
by the trial judge"." The task of reviewing all of
the involved transcripts would be too great for any
trial judge. The adversary system will be the best
method through which any specific itcmg of taint
could be- discovered. The opposing parties will, be
close to the record and more sensitive to the im-
plications that can be drawn from the record. Since
most of the recorded material will already be
known by,.the defendant, disclosure of this- large
number of records will be of littlehaza:rdto others.
Furthermore, the lower, courts should insure a
policy of non-disclosure through the issuance of
the appropriate orders to the defendant and his
counsel. Aldermagi calls for no oQther expansion of
the discovery rules in- the criminal -proceeding
under the continued close supervision of the trial
judge.
Mr, justice Harlan agreed that at most the in
camera proceeding would be an inefficient means
for discovering the tainted evidence; but he felt
that if in appropriate cases the Government's
concern for national security interests are "real
and not merely colorable" then an in camera pro-
ceeding would be best.u If any arguably relevant
passages were found, they alone would be turned
over to the defendant. Mr. Justice Fortas agreed
with Mr. Justice Harlan that in a case affecting the
national security the defendant could peruse
"material relating to any activities except those
specifically directed to acts of sabotage, espionage,
or aggression by or on behalf of foreign states". 8
"See, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
"Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182
(1969).
21 Id. at 199.
2Id. at 209.
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In Taglianetti v. United States the Court had the
opportunity to again rule on the status of the in
camera proceeding.28 The defendant had been con-
victed of willfully attempting to evade income
taxes. He asked to examine all conversations to
which he was a party. Since there was difficulty in
determining whose voices were recorded he asked
to study some more of the logs. The District Court
inspected the records and turned over to the de-
fendant all the conversations in which it was found
that he had participated. The Supreme Court
affirmed since total inspection of all records without
an in camera proceeding is only required where
such a proceeding would be an "inadequate means
to safeguard a defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights".? Unlike Alderman, the task in Taglianetti
was not too complex for the trial judge nor was the
margin of error too great to disallow reliance on the
in camera procedure. There were key differences to
be found from the Alderman situation. The de-
fendant did not ask for all the records to which he
could object but only for those logs with conversa-
tions in which he had participated. This naturally
decreased the raw numbers of the logs and also
made the judge's determination an easier one to
make. Thus, the efficient administration of justice
would not be impaired and all of the defendant's
rights would remain enforced. However, the Court
does not indicate why turning over the records
under a non-disclosure order would not have been
more efficient and, under Alderman, fairer.
It seems clear that while the Court took another
step in strengthing the Constitutional shield
around the accused, it may have dulled the sword
which carefully guarded the national security. In
the final analysis, the issue is one of broad dimen-
sions: can the Government trust the accused with
information that may have implications or reper-
cussions beyond the scope of his particular case?
The number of cases involving material possibly
vital or sensitive to the national security would be
small, and an exception here-to allow in camera
determinations-may slow up judicial. process to
some extent; but, it would also insure against the
possibility of misuse of the records even in face of
court orders. In either event, the judge who rules on
the motion to suppress would still be thoroughly
acquainted with the results of the surveillance3 s
26 Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316 (1969).
27 id. at 317.
28 In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), the
Court held that the rule of Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), which rejected the presence or absence
Spinelli v. United States: Determining
Probable Cause
Spinelli v. United Statesu explicated the analysis
to be used by reviewing courts in dealing with the
problem of whether or not there was probable
cause to issue a warrant. The appropriate principles
were recently set out in Aguilar v. Texas.30 That
opinion dictates that to find probable cause
the magistrate must be informed of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the in-
formant concluded that the [objects of the
search or seizure] were where he claimed they
were and some of the underlying circumstances
from which the officer concluded that the in-
formant ... was "credible" or his information
"reliable"."2
Thus, the basis for a finding of probable cause is to
be found by careful review of the affiant's allega-
tions as to the nature of the activities from which
probable cause was inferred and as to the reliability
of the informant. The mere conclusions of an un-
substantiated informant would not be enough for
the issuing officer to find probable cause.
In Spinelli the report of the anonymous inform-
ant was alleged by the government to be corrobo-
rated by an FBI investigation. Basically, the
affidavit showed a continued and frequent contact
by the petitioner with certain areas which the FBI
had been informed were the headquarters for a
gambling operation. But the Court found the
strength of the informant's tip insufficient to
establish probable cause, and outlined the analysis
necessary for the review of the requirements for
probable cause.
First, the informer's tip is measured against the
double test of Aguilar. If it cannot meet those
standards, the other allegations involved should be
analyzed. The next question becomes
[c]an it fairly be said that the tip, even when
certain parts of it have been corroborated by
of physical intrusion as a criterion for the reasonable-
ness of electronic surveillance under the Fourth Amend-
ment is to be applied only prospectively. Also in this
term the Court ruled that evidence violative of Sec. 605
of the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103, 47
U.S.C. 605, is admissible in state criminal trials unless
it was sought to have been introduced after Lee v.
Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968). Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S.
80 (1968).
29 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
30 378 U.S. 108 (1964).31Id. at 114.
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independent sources, is as trustworthy as a
tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without
independent corroboration? 2
This seems to be no more than saying that the
affidavit taken as a whole must satisfy Aguilar. If
the tip does not fall within the boundaries set, the
magistrate is not to totally discount it. Rather he
can weigh it in the final balance along with other
support to be found in the affidavit. Of course, if
the affidavit still cannot satisfy Aguilar then no
probable cause should be found by the magistrate
and any arrest or seizure based on such warrant
must be declared illegal.
The Court intimates that the most crucial point
in the examination of the affidavit is the review of
the underlying circumstances from which the in-
formant drew his opinion as to the nature of the
suspect's activities.3 It seems dear that while an
affidavit need not establish a prima face case of
guilt,14 it should contain a substantial amount of
detail concerning the activities of defendant in
order to raise the basis for the Government's action
beyond a mere suspicion. It would be helpful for
the framing of future affidavits and complaints to
list the deficiencies found in the Spinelli affidavit:
1) There was no support for the conclusion
that the informant was reliable.
It would seem best in this regard to require the
listing of specific case names and dispositions of
previous successful experience with the informant.
Possibly, even the informant's criminal record if
relevant to the charge at hand would be helpful to
display that he knew proper sources.35
2) Failure to allege how the source received
his information.
Personal observation by the confidant should be
highly detailed and very comprehensive. Cer-
tainly, approximate dates and places should be
included. If the informant did not receive his in-
formation by observation, then he should explain
his sources and substantiate their reliability.Y Al-
22 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,415 (1969).
3Id. at 416.3 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
35 See, United States v. Barnett, 407 F.2d 1114, 1117-
8 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Kidd, 407 F.2d 1316
(6th Cir. 1969).
a6See, Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958).
37See, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269(1960).
though the requirement is unclear, there must at
least be sufficient detail so that the issuing officer
[m]ay know that he is relying on something
more substantial than a casual rumor circulat-
ing in the underworld or an accusation based
merely on an individual's general reputation."'
3) Independent police investigations should
substantiate the informant's report.
Abnormal or unusual activity observed by officers
should be included in the affidavit. The mere use of
telephones is not enough in a bookmaking investi-
gation without knowing, for example, that the
defendant had five phones in a two-room apartment.
Total emphasis should be placed on corroborating
and lending greater credibility to the informant's
conclusions."9
4) Previous criminal activity of the subject.
Although not mentioned specifically in Spinelli,
prior convictions of the suspect or prior success-
fully executed search warrants at his home can be
of some aid to the magistrate or Commissioner in
finding probable cause. In Jones v. United States O
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote that the fact
... that petitioner was a knowni user of nar-
cotics made the charge against him much less
subject to scepticism than would be such a
charge against one without such a history4M
A simple assertion of police suspicion will be of no
weight on review while a documented cause for
that suspicion will add to the strength of the affida-
vit.
The Spinelli decision is a giant step towards de
novo review of every magistrate's conclusions at
the appellate level. It must be noted that the war-
rant in issue has passed the judicial scrutiny of the
magistrate, the district court, and the court of
appeals. The Court has ruled that preference
should be accorded on review to those activities
exercised under a warrant4M Acting under a warrant
is dearly responding to the demands of the Fourth
38 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,416 (1969).3 See, McCreay v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir.
1969); United States v. Rich., 407 F.2d 934, 937 (5th
Cir. 1969).
40 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
AId. See, Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528,
532 (1964). Cf., Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166,
174 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
4 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-7(1965).
19691
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Amendment. The language-of-Ventresca, quoted at
some length below, sets forth- the problems in the
practical sense while Spinelli seems to have disre-
garded these very real considerations:
If the teachings of. theCourt's cases are to be
followed and the constitutional policy served,
affidavits for search warrants, such as the one
involved here, must be tested and interpreted
by magistrates and courts in a commonsense
and realistic fashion. They are normally
drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste
of a criminal investigation. Technical require-
ments of elaborate specificity once exacted
-under common law pleadings have no proper
place in this area. A grudging or negative
attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants
will tend to discourage police officers from sub-
mitting their evidence to a judicial officer be-
fore acting.
... the courts should not invalidate the war-
rant by interpreting the affidavit in a hyper-
technical, rather than a commonsense manner
.... the resolution of doubtful or marginal
cases in this area should be largely determined
by the preference to be accorded to warrants.
... It is vital that having done so their actions
should'be sustained under a system of justice
responsive both to the need of individual lib-
erty and to the rights of the community.A
These reasoned words of Mr. Justice Goldberg were
shunned or ignored by the Spinelli Court but at the
same time the warrant was probably defective
under Aguilar. The affidavit need not document
every fact, but rather "enough information [should]
be presented to the Commissioner'to enable him to
make the judgment that the charges arenot capri-
cious and are sufficiently supported to justify
bringing into play the further steps of the criminal
process"."
Ciimel v. California: Search Incident
to an Arrest
The Fourth Amendment's guaranty of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures also was
the focus in Chimel v. California.45 Police officers
with an 'arrest warrant waited for the defendant at
his house. Upon his arrival they executed the war-
rant and, over his objection and without a search
Id. at 108-112.
- "Jaben v.,United States, 381 U.S. 214,224-5 (1965).
45 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
warrant, searched the entire house. The intensity
of the hour-long search varied from room-to-room
but the search resulted in the seizure of the fruits of
the burglary for which Chimel was subsequently
convicted.
Assuming the validity of the arrest, the Court
discussed the "basic questions concerning the per-
missible scope under the Fourth Amendment of a
search incident to a lawful arrest".46 At the outset
the author of the opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart,
noted that the decisions of the Court in this area
have been far from consistent. Essentially the
arguments crystallized at two poles of the law. On
the one hand, a search incident to a lawful arrest
could extend to an area under the "possession" or
"control" of the defendant. The second pole was
represented by those cases which held that such a
search could only include those areas where a de-
fendant might conceal a weapon which would
endanger the arresting officers or to areas where
the defendant may be able to reach for weapons or
destroy evidence.
The major ruling relied upon by those arguing
that the search may extend to areas within the con-
trol or possession of the defendant is Harris v.
United States.41 In Harris the defendant was seized
in the living room of his four-room apartment on
two warrants for his arrest. In the course of the
ensuing five-hour search the officers found a sealed
envelope with the defendant's name and "personal
papers" enscribed on it. The envelope was opened
nevertheless and in it was found Selective Service
cards which had been altered. The defendant was'
tried and convicted for concealing and altering
Selective Service cards which was a charge wholly
unrelated to the original arrest warrants.
The Court upheld the search and the use of the
cards in the subsequent trial. The opinion first
notes that a search warrant is not required by the
terms of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held
that a search incident to arrest under appropriat6
circumstances may extend beyond the person df the
one arrested7 to include the premises under his
immediate control.4"Certainly, the Court argued,
the search could extend to an area beyond the room
in which the defendant was arrested. A search
could not be limited by the fortuity ofarresting the
defendant in one room instead of another. As long
as the officers were not engaging in a general explor-
46 Id. at 755-56.
I331 U.S. 145 (1947).
49 Id. at 151.
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ation of the premises the search would be allowable.
In some cases, the size of the article looked for
would have an effect on the scope of the search.
The more obvious the item the less extensive and
probing the allowable search would be.
Another pillar of the "possession-control" theory
was United States v. Rabinowitz.45 In Rabinowitz the
officer arrested the defendant in his one-room
office without a search warrant. In. a thorough
search of the office for one-and-a-half hours the
officers uncovered overwhelming evidence of guilt.,
Upholding the- search, the Court first noted that
there was a "longstanding practice of searching
for other proofs of guilt within the control of the
accused found upon arrest"."0 The room under the
"immediate and complete control" of the defend-
ant was a proper subject for the search. Even if
the officers had time to get a warrant the reason-
ableness of the search was in no way lessened be-
cause they had not obtained one." Thus the law
in this view was that the reasonableness demanded
by the Fourth Amendment allowed the search of
areas generally within the control of the defendant
and not only the areas which at the time of arrest
were within his reach or his immediate vicinity.
This rationale was followed in Abel v. United
States52 where a.complete search of an apartment
was allowed in an arrest effected through the co-
operation of the FBI and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. However, here the Court
did allude to the rule that only readily obtainable
weapons or destroyable evidence could be seized
without a warrant.53 The rationale was again fol-
lowed in Ker v. California," where the Court re-
affirmed the proposition that reasonable searches
of considerable scope without a warrant incident
to a valid arrest are legal.
Contrary to the views advanced in the Harris-
Rabinowitz rationale, another pole of authority
also existed. In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States 5 a search of a whole office without a warrant
was held to be a "lawless invasion of the premises
45 339 U.S. 56 (1950).50 Id. at 61.5 See, note 59, infra.2362 U.S. 217 (1960).
Id. at 238.
374 U.S. 23 (1963). In Ker the police entered with-
out permission and found one defendant in the living
room. The other defendant emerged from the kitchen
and the officers saw marijuana in the kitchen, More
narcotics were found in the kitchen and in a bedroom.
The next day a warrantless search of their car produced
more drugs used against the defendants at their trial.
55 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931).
and a general exploratory searchin. the hope. that
evidence of crime might be found". But there were
other abrasive factorMt worlq in,,that case. The
officers had misrepresented that they had a. search
warrant and they threatened physical violence to
those who did not cooperate with the search. The
officers also had gone beyond a search of the plainly
visible items. Finally, the Court noted, that there
had been an, abundance of time and information
available on which to swear out a warrant.
Go-Bart soon became the basis for overturning a
conviction based on a warrantle~s search of a par-
titioned one-room area." The Cqurt made it clear
that searches of premises merely to discover evi-
dence of a crime would not be tolerated, Only
searches for specific items which were evidence of
the crime or items that could be used:to commit a
crime could become the object of a warrantless
search incident to an arrest.
The third of the trilogy'of cases'which are con-
sidered as limiting the scope of' the searches per-
rnissible under the Fourth Amendment is Trupiano
v. United StatesY The defendant was seized while
working over a liquor still which had long been the
object of government surveillance. The still also
was seized at that time. The Court held this to be
an unreasonable search as search warrants should
be used "wherever reasonably practicable".- In-
convenience of getting a warrant or any slight delay
pursuant thereto would be no justification for a
warrantless search where the property could, not
have been easily moved but could have been ade-
quately guarded. 59 The "foreseeability or necessity
of the seizure" became the keystones to the reason-
ableness of the search. But as in Harris, the Court
strongly emphasized that
... the proximity of the contraband property
to the person of [the defendant] at the moment
of his arrest was a fortuitous circumstance
which was inadequate to legalize the seizure.6"
Thus, while the test was the "apparent need for
summary seizure", the actual location or real
r 6 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
57344 U.S. 699 (1948).
Is Id. at 705.
69 In Rabinowitz v. United States, 379 U.S. 56, 61(1950), Trupiano was overruled to the extent that it
had made the reasonableness of securing a warrant a
factor to be considered in determining the reasonable-
ness of the search or seizure.
'
5 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 707(1948).
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control of the defendant over the area was not
material.
The Court did try in James v. Louisiana6' to
redefine or at least re-explicate the proper scope
of warrantless searches. In a per curiam opinion the
Court said that "a search can be incident to an
arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous
with the arrest and is confined to the immediate
vicinity of the arrest". In that case the Court re-
versed a conviction where after the defendant was
arrested two blocks from his home the officers took
him to his house, broke in, and conducted a several
hour search of it. But, again in Preston v. United
States6a 2 the Court mentioned its rule that only the
area within which the defendant could obtain
weapons or evidence was proper for a search inci-
dent to an arrest.
The majority in Chimel was convinced that the
Go-Bart-Lefkowitz-Trupiano pole was correct law.
The Chimel opinion held that after a valid arrest a
search will only be reasonable to the extent of
searching the person to remove any weapons that
could be used to effect an escape or to remove any
evidence that the defendant could conceal or
destroy. The area into which an arrestee might
reach for a weapon or evidence also is within a
reasonable scope for a warrantless search. In all
other cases the search may be extended only pursu-
ant to the authority of a warrant. Rabinowitz and
Harris were restricted to their facts and are not to
be followed in any way inconsistent with the dic-
tates of Chimel. Otherwise, "no consideration
relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any
point of rational limitation, once the search is
allowed to go beyond the area from which the per-
son arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary
items"."
The Court anticipated a problem by further
noting that vehicles may be searched without
warrants where securing a warrant would be im-
practical because the vehicle could easily be moved
out of the jurisdiction." A major problem for law
enforcement may well arise here in a typical situa-
tion where the officers arrest the defendant in his
car without a search warrant. If they have the
defendant in custody or take the car back to the
station with them, the validity of the search of the
car at the moment of arrest is a problem. The
courts in these cases should take notice of the
61382 U.S. 36, 37 (1965).
376 U.S. 364 (1963).
"Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969).64 Id. at 764 n.9.
likelihood that if the defendant's car is left at the
scene of arrest one of his cohorts could easily re-
move it before the search warrant is secured. It will
not always be feasible or practical to guard the car
until such time as a warrant can be secured. Nor
will it always be foreseeable that the arrest will or
will not be made in a vehicle. Thus, the agents
should be able to search the open and visible sec-
tions of the car immediately to seize that evidence
or those weapons that were within the grasp of the
accused in the car. In this manner then the search
would be reasonable in scope in light of the un-
usual method and circumstances of arrest.
Mr. Justice White forcefully dissented in Chime:
... it would be strange to say that the Fourth
Amendment bars the warrantless search, re-
gardless of the circumstances since the inva-
sion and disruption of a man's life and privacy
which stem from his arrest are ordinarily far
greater than the relatively minor intrusions
attending a search of the premises.65
He felt that the requirement of a search warrant in
all cases to be outside the language of the Amend-
ment; it is highly unreasonable to require the police
to get a search warrant where there "must always
be a strong possibility that confederates of the
arrested man will in the meantime remove the
item for which the police have probable cause to
search".6" Mr. Justice White would hold that
searches should' be allowed in certain situations and
... the fact of arrest supplies such an exigent
circumstance, since the police had lawfully
gained entry to the premises to effect the arrest
and since delaying the search to secure a war-
rant would have involved the risk of not re-
covering the fruits of the crime. 7
The major development to be noted from this
case is that now the fortuitous circumstance of
where a defendant is arrested will play a major role
in defining the extent of a pr6per search.6' The
requirement of a warrant in almost all cases then
becomes, as a practical necessity, an absolute. But
the Court does not make ciear how a search is made
any more reasonable by the presence of a warrant.
651 d. at 776.66 Id. at 764.
6Id. at 774.Cf., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 707
(1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152
(1947).
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If the warrant was for the house the search may
then be authorized to extend beyond the scope of
what was actually necessary. The real crux of the
problem-the seizure of incriminating items un-
related to the arrest-could be avoided in a less
restrictive way. In a search incident to a lawful
arrest, only those items related to that arrest
should be admissible without a warrant. Thus the
search would not be a general exploration but
rather a proper and reasonable examination for
evidence related to a crime for which the arrest-
being made on probable cause-was made. This
theory would allow the probable cause established
by the arrest to allow reasonable search to extend
to items involved in the crime of that arrest."
Although similar reasoning. has been forcefully
rejected by the Court, it does seem that the rea-
sonableness of securing a warrant for the place of
arrest should play some role in determining the
reasonableness of the ensuing search. In the mobile
society of today the criminal may have to be ar-
rested in one of many unanticipated places. Any
test should include whether the police could have
realized the possibility or probability of executing
the arrest in that area.
Davis v. Mississippi: Fingerprint Detention
This term the Court ruled that "detentions for
the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no
less subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amend-
ment".70 The case arose out of a rape in Meridian,
Mississippi on December 2, 1965. With only a
sketchy description of the rapist the police for ten
days thereafter took over twenty black youths to
the police station for questioning and fingerprint-
ing. They were released without further question-
ing. Others were questioned elsewhere. On Decem-
ber 3, the defendant, who occasionally worked for
the victim, was fingerprinted, and questioned. In
the ensuing days he was questioned at various
locations primarily about other possible suspects.
He was brought to the hospital room of the victim
but never was identified by her. Without probable
cause for arrest, he was taken to a prison ninety
miles away from his home and kept there over-
night. The next day he signed a confession after
taking a lie detector test. Returned to the jail in
the town of the crime, he was again fingerprinted.
The defendant's prints, along with others' prints
69 In two cases decided the same day as Chimed the
Court refused to decide whether or not Climd should
be applied retroactively. Von Cleef v. New Jersey,
395 U.S. 814 (1969); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818
(1969).
7 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
that had been taken were sent to Washington,
D.C. The FBI matched the defendant's prints
with those found at the scene of the rape.
The Court noted at the outset that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to discourage abusive
official action despite the relevancy or trust-
worthiness of the evidence obtained. Regardless of
the stage of the investigation-investigatory
or accusatory-the Fourth Amendment must be
enforced to prevent the "harrassment and ig-
nominy" of involuntary detention n
But the Court felt it unnecessary to decide
whether "the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment could be met by narrowly circumscribed
procedure for obtaining, during the course of
criminal investigation, the fingerprints of an in-
dividual for whom there is no probable cause to
arrest" 2 It noted certain unique characteristics
of fingerprint detention: 1) unlike a search or in-
terrogation there is no probing into the private
life or thoughts of the accused; 2) the process need
not be repetitive as one set would fulfill all needs;
3) the prints are reliable and effective evidence not
subject to abuse of force; and, 4) since there is no
danger of the destruction of the evidence, the
detention need not be unexpected or inconvenient
for the suspect. While these points indicate the
practicality of securing a warrant, they do not
offer a solution to the problem of demonstrating
probable cause.
In this phase, the Court felt Camera v. Munici-
pal Court3 was important. There the Court refused
to disallow all administrative searches without
warrants of structures for possible building code
violations. The major reasons which dissuaded the
Court from holding that the Fourth Amendment
should be strictly applied in that situation was
that the specificity of listing buildings would
hamper. area-wide inspections which are necessary,
for example, in the typical ghetto situation. The
area inspection was too valuable for building code
enforcement to be set aside by the Court which
would be the case if it had required the specificity
of a search warrant. Thus, the Court allowed the
inspections or searches if there was no objection
by the tenant or where citizens have complained
of an emergency or, even where other satisfactory
reasons were present.
Clearly, in the case of fingerprint detention
specificity of the warrant could be no obstacle to
71 Id. at 726.
72 Id.
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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the requisition of a warrant. The person could
easily be identified and the nature of the investi-
gation outlined. The problem is the requirement of
probable cause. The Court seems to intimate a
lesser standard which avoided unnecessary intru-
sions or inconveniences could be permissible. But
a lesser standard would also be subject to all the
dragnet type abuses against which the Fourth
Amendment stands as a shield. The probable cause
requirement is td prevent the Fourth Amendment
guaranty from becoming a "mere form of words" 4
The Fourth Amendment
cannot properly be invoked to exclude the
products of legitimate police investigative
techniques on the ground that much conduct
which is closely similar involves unwarranted
intrusions upon constitutional protections.
Moreover, in some contexts the rule is inef-
fective as a deterrent 5
The key element of the Davis case was that the
investigation there was not a professional one; it
was an abusive, general dragnet based on -very few
factual leads. To allow this type of activity with-
out the proper intervention and supervision of a
judicial officer would be dangerous. Anytime finger-
7
'-Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
71Id
prints were found at the scene of a crime the popu-
lace of that general neighborhood would be subject
to the rigor and tensions of a police fingerprinting.
Inevitably, the case would arise where one person's
prints would match those found at the scene of a
wholly unrelated crime. Although this evidence
would be highly reliable, the question would be
whether that evidence was obtained in a reason-
able search or seizure or whether that detention
for fingerprinting was legal. The freedom to detain
persons for fingerprinting without probable cause
could lead to the compilation of fingerprinting
files which would include prints of nearly the
total community. It is not to be doubted that this
would be an effective tool for law enforcement, but
the issue remains: would it be the result of uncon-
stitutional procedures. In Davis the detentions
clearly were illegal and official abuse of the method
was evident. What future police procedures might
fall within the exception-mentioned but not
delineated by the Davis opinion-of narrowly
proscribed procedures for certain circumstances is
not easy to foresee from the decision.
Mr. justice Black dissented in Davis and called
on the Court to reappraise and limit the scope of
the Fourth Amendment as it has developed over
the years in. order to create a safer environment
for the nation's urban population.7




DELINQUENTS AND NONDELiNQUENTS IN PER-
SPECTiVE. By Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1968, pp. xx, 268. $8.50
Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective
is the first in a new series of follow-up study reports
by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck on the status of
500 delinquent boys who had been committed to a
state training school and their matched controls.
Whatever else may be said of this latest effort,
one can only express admiration for the sheer
persistence of the Gluecks in tracking and studying
these cohort subjects to age 31. The magnitude of
this uniquely successful effort is evident in the
number of index cases and controls located and
studied (438 delinquents and 442 nondelinquents),
during the field investigation phase which began
in 1948 and was completed in 1963.
By the same token, however, this volume also
reflects the persistence and continued commitment
of the Gluecks to a largely non-theoretical, at-
tribute difference, multiple causation perspective.
As in much of their previous work, the Gluecks
take an eclectic position and remain convinced of
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